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    Abstract 
This article examines the political dilemma faced by the Economic and Monetary 
Union decision-makers with regards to fiscal policy co-ordination. It argues that 
two alternatives are available: national fiscal policies, constrained by budgetary 
rules at a central level, or a federal fiscal system. The operation of both of these 
options is discussed in accordance with the Optimal Currency Area theory and 
with reference to the monetary union in Europe. The former proves to be feasible, 




A monetary union without an accompanying economic and fiscal policy 
union would prove a house of cards that would collapse with every gust 
of wind.  
                                                           (Schiller in Dyson and Featherstone 1999:292) 
 
Having decided to move to the third stage of the monetary integration process in 
Europe in January 1999, the European Union’s member states took a gamble39 
hoping for a buoyant future. The euro was meant to reinforce the process of an 
“ever closer union” and guarantee robust economic growth in the years to come. 
However, so far the gamble has not paid off as the performance of the Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU) over the last five years has been a bitter 
disappointment. Some of the blame can be put on the European Central Bank 
(ECB), which pursued an extensively restrictive monetary policy that kept the 
interest rates uncomfortably high,40 and the membership countries themselves, 
especially the core countries like Germany and France, who failed to introduce the 
                                                 
∗ Current master’s student  in the European Studies Program, Aalborg University. The author would 
like to thank anonymous referees for their helpful comments.  
39 See M. Obstfeld “Europe’s Gamble” (1996). 
40 Although it has to be stressed that the interest rates have been brought down to historically low 
levels. 
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needed structural reforms. However, none of the above are mentioned as often as 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as the main reason for EMU sluggishness. 
Although it is widely accepted that fiscal stimulus is not the best long-term route 
to growth, it is the Pact’s inflexibility that is held responsible. 
 
Moreover, the establishment of the EMU brought about a very bizarre policy mix 
in Europe consisting of a centralised monetary policy accompanied by national 
fiscal policies. The implementation of the SGP, aiming at securing a viable policy 
mix, proved to be inefficient. Therefore further development of a European State, 
based on the embryo of the monetary union, requires in the first place an 
amendment to the fiscal policy co-ordination rules. Such an action, though, must 
be backed by a clear recognition of the political project implicit in EMU and 
development of a fully fledged political arena (Boyer 2000:25, 88). 
Taking into consideration the above facts, this article looks at the fiscal aspect of 
the monetary union in Europe. It envisages a political dilemma facing the EMU 
decision-makers who are bound to choose between democratic politics and 
national self-determination as far as fiscal policy of  “Euroland” is concerned. By 
taking the Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory as a point of departure, it 
concentrates both on the current co-existence of national budgets and the case of 
fiscal federalism and discusses the viability of both of these solutions.  
 
THE POLITICAL DILEMMA OF THE EUROZONE 
In his article “Feasible Globalizations”, Rodrik (2002)41 conceptualises the 
political trilemma of the global economy (figure 1) by arguing that “the nation-
state system, democratic politics, and full economic integration are mutually 
incompatible. We can have at most two out of three” (Rodrik 2002:1). As a way-
out, he calls for the creation of a renewed “Bretton Woods compromise”, 
preserving some limits on integration while establishing some global rules to 
handle the growing interconnectedness. 
 
41 See also Rodrik (2000). 
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Source: Rodrik (2002)   
        
The present author tries to bring this deliberation onto European grounds with 
special reference to the fiscal dimension of the EMU. Nevertheless, as the process 
of economic integration has almost been completed in Europe with the 
implementation of the single currency, backing out of it is not in question.42 
Therefore there are only two options available (figure 2). We can either have a 
monetary union with national fiscal policies, strictly limited by fiscal constraints,43 
for example in the form of the existing SGP, or a monetary union with a 
democratic federal fiscal system. However, in order to analyse their sustainability, 
we first have to examine their roles in accordance with the OCA theory 
underpinning the concept of a monetary union.             
 
                                                 
42However, as noted by Eichengreen and Frieden (2001:15): “Technically, exiting the monetary union 
is straight forward: the government of the participating member state needs only to restart the printing 
press and reissue the national currency. If a country left the monetary union because it felt that the 
ECB was following excessively inflationary policies, its ‘good’ domestic currency would drive out the 
‘bad’ European currency. If the country instead left because it felt that the ECB’s overly restrictive 
policies were aggravating unemployment, it would in addition have to declare that the euro would no 
longer be accepted as legal tender within its borders.” 
43 Friedman (in Rodrik 2002:15) calls such constraints the “Golden Straitjacket” that a country puts on: 
“Golden Straitjacket narrows the political and economic policy choices of those in power to relatively 
tight parameters. […] Once your country puts on the Golden Straitjacket, its political choices get 
reduced to Pepsi or Coke – to slight nuances of tastes, slight nuances of policy, slight alterations in 
design to account for local traditions, some loosening here or there, but never any major deviation 
from the core golden rules.” 
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MONETARY UNION AND NATIONAL BUDGETS 
The OCA theory44 sets up conditions that countries planning to introduce a 
common currency have to meet. It approaches the impact of a single exchange 
rate policy by taking into consideration the exposure of particular monetary union 
members to asymmetric shocks. It emphasises the operation of adjustment 
processes based on mobility of labour and wage flexibility, which enable partial 
or full accommodation of such shocks. Additionally, it lays stress on the high 
level of fiscal integration between countries or national fiscal flexibility as a 
further mechanism helping to restore equilibrium.  
Let us assume that neither labour mobility nor wage flexibility is able to 
accommodate fully an asymmetrical shock, and fiscal policy is needed to restore 
equilibrium. To proceed with this analysis we will concentrate on the case where a 
monetary union, formed of two countries - Country A and Country B, is 
accompanied by independent fiscal policies run autonomously by the membership 
countries. Therefore, a negative demand shock in Country A (figure 3) will cause 
the budget of this country to go into deficit or will increase the already existing 
one, because of declining tax revenues and a rising level of unemployment 
payments. On the contrary, Country B will experience increasing budget surpluses 
or declining deficits. If capital markets work efficiently, the need for the 
government of Country A to borrow will be accommodated by the increasing 
 
44 For the original texts see Mundell (1961),  McKinnon (1963), and Kenen (1969). For contemporary 
analysis of the OCA theory see for example De Grauwe (1997). 
IJIS Volume 2
P. STOLOWSKI – POLITICAL DILEMMA OF THE ECONOMIC & MONETARY UNION 
 
 107 
supply of savings in Country B45 and the equilibrium will be restored (De Grauwe 
1997:192). 
 




Source: P. De Grauwe (1997:6) 
 
Based on this simplified model, an argument can be made in favour of fully 
flexible and autonomous fiscal policies conducted by national governments 
participating in a monetary union. Moreover, such a way of managing fiscal 
policy is in line with the principle of subsidiarity as defined by Pius XI (in Inman 
and Rubinfeld 1998:1): 
Just as it is wrong to take away from individuals what they can 
accomplish by their own ability and effort and entrust it to a community, 
so it is an injury and at the same time both a serious evil and a 
disturbance of right order to assign a larger and higher society what can 
be performed successfully by smaller and lower communities. 
As argued by Boyer (2000:88), the implementation of subsidiarity might appear to 
be a solution to the long-term viability of the single currency.  
However, fiscal expansion may appear to be a source of shock itself.46 First of all, 
increasing debt today implies higher taxes tomorrow. If factors of production are 
                                                 
45 However, one has to remember that the level of these budgetary effects depends to a large extent on 
the degree of wage flexibility and labour mobility (De Grauwe 1997:192). 
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mobile, as in the case of a monetary union, the prospect of raising taxes can lead 
to a situation of capital flight and labour migration, thus leading to the erosion of 
the tax base. It would also decrease substantially the competitiveness of a 
particular country. Therefore, the more integrated the factor markets are, the more 
difficult it is for a government to increase spending (Eichengreen 1993:1335). 
Secondly, expansionary fiscal policies of some countries can cause a rise in the 
interest rates in all the member states, hence, crowd out investment. Furthermore, 
financial capital inflow will lead to the single currency appreciation and reduction 
in the competitiveness of export production (Kenen 1995:91). Lastly, there is a 
problem of budget deficit sustainability.47 It is defined as follows (De Grauwe 
1997:194): 
A budget deficit leads to an increase in government debt which will have 
to be serviced in the future. If the interest rate on the government debt 
exceeds the growth rate of the economy, a debt dynamic is set in motion 
which leads to an ever-increasing government debt relative to GDP. 
This becomes unsustainable, requiring corrective action. 
For that reason, the use of fiscal policy has limits in offsetting negative economic 
shocks. In addition, due to the spill over effects, national fiscal policies can 
generate economic instability in all the members of the monetary union. 
These arguments, however, were played down constantly by proponents of fiscal 
autonomy. De Grauwe (1996) argued that once an independent central bank is set 
up and the governments lose control over their central banks, the capital markets 
will be able to force them to fiscal retrenchment. The assumption here is that, if 
the capital markets work efficiently, the problem of growing indebtness in one 
country will not be transferred outside its borders as the markets will attach a risk 
premium only to that particular country’s bonds. Therefore, interest rates in other 
monetary union members will remain unchanged (De Grauwe 1997:198).  
Dornbusch (1997) points also to the provision of “no-bailout”. In accordance with 
article 103 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC):48
 
46 As argued by Obstfeld (1996:280), the fiscal expansion of the Johnson administration during the 
1960’s helped to bring down the Bretton Woods, whereas the German reunification can be held 
responsible for the 1992/1993 European Monetary System crisis. 
47 For further analysis of this problem see De Grauwe (1997). 
48 The no-bailout clause was also implemented in the “Protocol on the Statue of the European System 
of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank” (art. 21). 
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The Community shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of 
central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of any Member 
State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint 
execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or 
assume the commitments of central governments, regional, local or 
other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial 
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. 
In view of the above, borrowing commitments of Member States are their internal 
problem, hence, any externalities of fiscal expansions are unlikely. Additionally, 
regardless of the above critique, von Hagen and  Eichengreen (1996) argue that, in 
the event of financial difficulties, countries retain the possibility of raising their 
own taxes, which reinforces the credibility of the no-bailout rule.49
Nevertheless, none of the above advocates seem to fully recognise the prospect of 
free-riding once the monetary union is in place. As the Maastricht Treaty does not 
allow for any country to be expelled from the EMU, a monetary union becomes a 
public good, and as with every public good, it is exposed to the aforementioned 
problems.  By over borrowing, countries risk defaulting on their debt by means of 
stopping interest payments on the outstanding debt50 (De Grauwe 1997:203). As 
an ex-post bailout is prohibited under the current readings of both the TEC and the 
ESCB Statute, the remaining option for the ECB is to bailout countries facing debt 
crisis by keeping interest rates low to lighten the debt-service burden (ex-ante 
bailout) (von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996). Such actions, though, might 
endanger the prime objective of the ECB, i.e. price stability. Therefore, fiscal 
rules can help to make ECB less likely to face such a dilemma (Masson 1996).51
 
 
49 In the debate between the proponents and opponents of biding fiscal rules in the EMU, the United 
States monetary union experience was also claimed as supporting both positions. The former group 
pointed to the existence of a state’s own voluntary constitutional limitations on borrowing and their 
usefulness, whereas the latter emphasised the joint absence of post-war defaults by state governments 
and of federally-imposed fiscal rules (Goldstein and Woglom 1992:253).   
50 This option is labelled in the literature as an “outright default”. The other option available, an 
“implicit default”, is achieved by creating surprise inflation and devaluation in order to reduce the real 
value of the debt (see De Grauwe 1997).  
51 Another way of eliminating free-riding, stemming from the traditional “realist” approach, would be 
emergence of a dominant state, a local hegemon, willing to use its power to keep the monetary union 
functioning effectively on terms agreeable to all (Cohen 2001:192).  
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FISCAL CONSTRAINS ON NATIONAL BUDGETS IN THE EMU 
The above analysis suggests that fully flexible national fiscal policies of monetary 
union members may be unsustainable in the long-run. Hence, constraints on them 
seem to be interpreted as safeguards for the Union’s credibility. However, in the 
case of the EMU, the “Golden Straitjacket” was put on countries even prior to the 
euro introduction. Initially, it took form through the Maastricht convergence 
criteria52 which were meant to secure the establishment of a deeply rooted 
“stability culture” that would ensure a viable monetary union and enable the ECB 
to produce stable prices at low real costs (Winkler 1995). Nevertheless, once it 
appeared that the third stage of the EMU would be composed of a wide number of 
countries, the fear of free-riding intensified. It led to the implementation, mostly 
on the German insistence, of the SGP obliging Member States to “respect the 
medium-term budgetary objective of close to balance or in surplus” (European 
Council 1997). It also set out the borderline for the budget deficit at the level of 
3% of the GDP53 and gave the Council the right to use sanctions amounting to 
0.5% of the GDP against countries that are found in breach of the Pact. 
Both the Excessive Deficit Procedure, which is a part of the Maastricht Treaty, 
and the SGP itself, reflect the “structure [of the EMU] that is preoccupied by a 
‘sound money’ view, in which the central risk is perceived to be a ‘debt trap’” 
(Dyson 2000:9). They try to bridge the gap between economic rationale, calling 
for a closer co-operation of economic policies, and political feasibility. As noted 
by Tsoukalis (2003:157): 
We have created a European single currency with a weak and 
unbalanced institutional structure, and rigid rules to compensate for 
those faults. This is what was politically feasible at the time, and the 
architects of EMU went for it, postponing several difficult decisions – 
only half-consciously perhaps, since their design closely reflected 
current economic fashion. 
Such a feeble structure may, however, jeopardise the outcome of the monetary 
integration process.  
 
52 For the analysis of the Maastricht convergence criteria see for example Winkler (1999) and De 
Grauwe (1997). 
53 The German preoccupation with the reference value of 3% of the GDP seemed to be theoretical and 
artificial as no theory supported such a precise figure (see Dyson and Featherstone 1999:9). 
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The SGP has recently come under severe criticism. It has been renamed the 
“Stupidity Pact” after the President of the European Commission, R. Prodi, called 
it stupid (The Economist 2002a), and “The Instability and Depression Pact” (The 
Economist 2002b). Moreover, De Grauwe (2002) sees it as a vote of no 
confidence by the European authorities in regards to the strength of the member 
countries. According to him: 
It is quite surprising that EU-countries have allowed this to happen, and 
that they have agreed to be subjected to control by European institutions 
that even the International Monetary Fund does not impose on banana 
republics (De Grauwe 2002). 
Although a requirement of some fiscal constraint within the EMU is widely 
recognised, the Pact has failed to strike a right balance between the need for rules 
and flexibility. According to De Grauwe (1997:206-9), “the stability pact has been 
guided more by the fear of unsustainable debts and deficits than by the need for 
flexibility”. It is too inflexible, especially at a time of economic slowdown when it 
forces countries to tighten fiscal policies in the situation of falling tax revenues as 
their economies slide into recession. It has also failed to distinguish properly 
between cyclical and structural factors (The Economist 2003). Moreover, the 
reference value of GDP 3% appears to be arbitrary and “could hamper the 
operation of the automatic stabilisers and thus increase the volatility of output” 
(Beetsma 2001:24).54 Additionally, in November 2003 the SGP appeared to be 
unenforceable. After it has been breached for two consecutive years by France and 
Germany, the majority of the Member States voted against the recommendations 
of the Commission that wanted to initiate the Excessive Deficit Procedure against 
both of them. In fact, the decision of the ECOFIN Council meant the abolishment 
of the Pacts rules.   
At the very least, the SGP should be redefined in terms of the fiscal balance 
adjusted over the economic cycle which would give governments a bit more room 
to respond to a slump (The Economist 2002b). It also has to pay more attention to 
the aggregate fiscal stance. As argued by Buti et al. (2002: 11), “the aggregation 
of nationally-determined fiscal policies may not result in an optimal fiscal stance 
at the euro area level… and may not be suitable to ensure an adequate policy 
mix”. Such an inappropriate fiscal stance may occur even without violation of the 
Pact.55 Reform of it should also eliminate the disincentives to government 
 
54 See also Eichengreen and  Wyplosz (1998). 
55 For more on the reform of the SGP see De Grauwe (2003) and Buiter (2003). 
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investment in infrastructure and human capital, created by the current rules, which 
are said to be crucial for boosting long term economic growth (De Grauwe 2003). 
Remodelling the Pact, however, would not remove the “Golden Straitjacket” 
circumscribing autonomy of national fiscal policies. Therefore, it appears to be 
worthwhile to consider the option of fiscal federalism in Europe.56  
 
MONETARY UNION AND FISCAL FEDERALISM 
Let us recall the assumption made earlier in the text: a monetary union, formed by 
two countries, Country A and Country B, experiences an asymmetrical shock 
(figure 3) that neither labour mobility nor wage flexibility is able to accommodate 
fully, and fiscal policy is needed to restore equilibrium. However now we suppose 
that both countries, apart from centralising their monetary policy conduct, have 
also centralised a substantial part of their national budgets. Thus, the centralised 
budget will work as a shock absorber. The decline in tax revenues in Country A 
will be offset by the increase in transfers from the central budget, whereas the tax 
revenue increase in Country B will be accompanied by the decline in spending of 
the central budget. In this way equilibrium will be restored. The main difference 
between a centralised budget and national fiscal policies is that in the former case 
the country does not have to increase its external debt and face the prospect of 
servicing it in the future (De Grauwe 1997:191-192). 
The above analysis gives us a reason to claim that the creation of a monetary 
union should be accompanied by the implementation of fiscal federalism between 
the countries considered.57 The theory of fiscal federalism states that: 
…the central government should have the basic responsibility for the 
macroeconomic stabilisation function and for income redistribution in 
the form of assistance to the poor. […] In the absence of monetary and 
exchange rate prerogatives and with highly open economies that cannot 
contain much of the expansionary impact of fiscal stimuli, provincial, 
state, and local governments simply have very limited means for 
traditional macroeconomic control of their economies (Oates 
1999:1121). 
 
56 See for example  Korkman (2001), Grahl (2001) and the references therein. 
57 This argument was raised originally by Kenen (1969). 
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Three distinct functions are being assigned to fiscal federalism (Eichengreen 
1993:1337): first, the equalisation function that allows the low-income regions to 
continuously receive transfers from the rest of the federation;58 second, the 
stabilisation effect that causes the federal tax liabilities of all regions to go down 
and transfer receipts to go up once all regions enter recession simultaneously; and 
third, the regional co-insurance function that allows for the increase in the net 
transfers from the federal budget to a country that enters a recession not 
experienced by the rest of the federation members, i.e. a country hit by an 
asymmetrical shock. The last effect is meant to be a necessary component of a 
viable monetary union. 
 
FISCAL FEDERALISM AND THE EMU 
The problem of fiscal co-ordination in the future monetary union in Europe was 
brought to light during the work of the Werner Group in the 1970’s. The 
MacDougall Report (Commission 1977) suggested the creation of a centralised 
European budget capable of containing potential asymmetrical shocks. It 
recommended a three-stage approach (Hitiris 2003:101): 
• “pre-federal integration, with a Community public sector taking up 2-2.5% 
of Community GDP; 
• federation with a small Community public sector, 5-7% of GDP;59 and  
• union with a large Community public sector, 20-25% of GDP.” 
 
Lack of “political homogeneity” at that time to justify such a move was seen as an 
impediment on the road to a deeper fiscal integration (Hitiris 2003:101). The 
Delors Report (Commission 1989) reinforced that call by arguing in favour of the 
establishment of a powerful fiscal shock absorber at the central level, in order to 
deal with asymmetrical shocks (Kletzer and von Hagen 2001:2). However, none 
of these claims have been reflected in the Maastricht Treaty. 
The debate on fiscal mechanisms in the future monetary union in Europe rests to a 
large extent on the United States experience. The study of Sala-i-Martin and Sachs 
(1992), argues that the existence of a federal tax system was the reason behind the 
 
58 In the European Union the effect of equalisation is addressed by the notion of cohesion (Eichengreen 
1993:1337). 
59 It has to be remembered that “the Report was considering a monetary union among a smaller and 
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viability of the dollar exchange rate, and found that approximately 40% of the 
one-dollar shock in a particular State is absorbed by the Federal Government.60 
Also Bayoumi and Masson (1995) support this view by taking into consideration 
the case of both the American and Canadian fiscal systems.61 A more recent study 
by Kletzer and von Hagen (2001) calls not only for the introduction of fiscal 
federalism, but an advanced co-ordination of economic policies. It argues that: 
…the adoption of a common currency among a set of highly integrated 
regions implies that governments of these regions should no longer 
regard policies aiming at structural reforms of their local goods and 
labour markets as matters of purely regional concern (Kletzer and von 
Hagen 2001: 37). 
Nevertheless, the implementation of fiscal federalism faces at least two major 
problems as far as the current European Union budget is concerned. First and 
foremost, it is too small. The budgetary ceiling rests at the level of 1.27% of the 
GNP and, together with the prohibition of borrowing, it makes the EU budget 
hardly comparable to the central budget common to federations and the provisions 
made by the MacDougall Report (Tondl 2000:235-6). Second, the structure of 
both the revenues and expenditures is far from meeting the functions of fiscal 
federalism. The revenue side consists of four sources.  However, the GNP-based 
national contributions and the community’s share in the VAT account for almost 
82% of the total revenues.62 The two remaining resources include custom duties 
and agriculture levies (Hitiris 2003:95-96). The revenues are primarily regressive 
as the poorer countries generally spend a higher share of their income on 
consumption and are more import-dependent compared to richer members. A 
limited progressiveness is reflected only in the case of the GNP-based 
contributions (Tondl 2000:239). Almost 80% of the budget expenditures are 
devoted to the Common Agriculture Policy and Structural Funds. The cohesion 
impact of the former is rather mixed. Although within countries it has a positive 
redistributive impact, on average it transfers income from richer regions to the 
poorer ones, where higher food prices have a regressive impact on consumers, as 
lower income households spend a higher share of their budget on food (Tsoukalis 
1997:214). The operation of the latter has a clear redistributive effect. The total 
transfers in the period of 1994-99 represented 0.45% of the EU GDP and are 
 
60 Their results were criticised by von Hagen (1992) for failing to distinguish between the equalisation 
and insurance functions of transfers.  
61 According to their measures, the stabilisation effect is around 30%. 
62 Data concerning the EU’s general budget for 2002.  
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estimated to have an income equalisation effect of 5% (Commission data cited by 
Tsouklais 1997:204). However, it has to be noted that structural fund transfers are 
not used to correct income differentials, but to finance public investment in the 
weaker regions (Commission 1989:22). 
Therefore, the implementation of the principles of fiscal federalism requires a 
general modification of the EU budget. As proposed by G. Tondl (2000:252-3): 
The central points are the introduction of individual EU taxes, social 
transfers to individuals, and a sharp reduction of CAP guarantee 
payments in favour of other expenditure items. The management of 
interregional distribution, now operated by several funds, could be 
effected by a single, new cohesion fund. 
Having such a healthy-constructed budget would allow at least for the 
establishment of a system of fiscal equalisation based, for example, on the 
German Länderfinanzausgleich (Kletzer and von Hagen 2001:17). 
 
CONCLUSION      
The creation of the EMU in Europe was made possible by political consensus 
among state leaders. It was meant to become an embryo for a future European 
State. However, to date the centralisation has taken place only in the monetary 
component of economic policy. The implementation of the SGP as an element of 
fiscal co-ordination has proved inefficient. Therefore, the EMU decision-makers 
are facing a dilemma concerning the conduct of fiscal policies in the monetary 
union. As neither backing out of the single currency project nor keeping fully 
autonomous national fiscal policies is possible, they must choose between 
national fiscal policies, constrained by the ‘Golden Straitjacket’ in the form of 
some central rules, or the federal fiscal system. This article has analysed their 
operation in accordance with the Optimal Currency Area theory only, which limits 
the validity of the agreed upon conclusions, as the problems of the EMU go far 
beyond the fiscal aspects. Nevertheless, it can be argued that decentralised 
budgetary policies are feasible, but not desirable. The recent troubles of the Euro 
zone’s two biggest economies, namely France and Germany, reaffirm that 
statement. The latter may be desirable, but it is not feasible.63 Fiscal federalism 
has not yet won enough support in Europe to be treated as more than a theoretical 
 
63 See Rodrik (2002). 
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option. Still, its implementation appears to be desirable as it could help to correct 
the democratic deficit in the EMU. The “traditional mystique” surrounding 
monetary policy could be offset by more democratic accountability required in the 
case of the federal budget. Thus, a new institution accountable to the European 
Parliament is required in order to balance the domination of the ECB in the 
economic debate at the European level. The new born Eurogroup, consisting of 
finance ministers from the EMU participating countries, seems to be the natural 
selection (see e.g. Tsoukalis 2003). As Tocqueville predicted, writing in the first 
half of the nineteenth century, “in the democratic ages which are opening upon us 
[...] centralisation will be the natural government” (Tocqueville in Oates 
1999:1145).  
During the work of the European Convention, a great opportunity for changing 
the current readings of the treaty passed. The draft constitution, prepared by the 
group chaired by Giscard d’Estaing, has not changed anything as far as the 
excessive-deficit procedure is concerned. Another chance that is nearing on the 
horizon is the perspective of budget 2007-13 talks. However, a serious 
impediment on the road to a federal budget, and further to a European State, might 
be far beyond economic rationale and political commitments. A successful EMU, 
where both the “E” and the “M” are in place, might require a genuine sense of 
community among countries, defined by Keohane and Hoffmann (1991:13) as “a 
network form of organization, in which individual units are defined not by 
themselves but in relation to other units”. From that point of view, federalism has 
still a long way to go in Europe.             
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